New Summary of Global Anti-Bribery Enforcement Activity Highlights U.S. Leadership and the Importance of FCPA Due Diligence for M&A Transactions

Last week TRACE International released its first ever summary of worldwide anti-bribery activity, covering 33 years of global enforcement. Interestingly, TRACE also announced plans to release annual reports on this topic going forward. TRACE found that the United States is by far the world leader in anti-bribery enforcement – accounting for 75% of anti-bribery enforcement actions initiated world-wide. Other countries in their top five list are: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, and Italy. Moreover, as the recent Imnospec case illustrates, the SEC and DOJ are increasingly cooperating with other countries' enforcement agencies on anti-bribery cases.

The United States will likely remain the world leader in this area with the SEC's increased emphasis on FCPA enforcement. Additionally, the recently passed Dodd bill includes increased incentives for whistleblowers – contemplating rewards of up to 30% of any fines collected as the result of FCPA enforcement actions. These incentives, if implemented, would further condense the time to decide whether to report a potential FCPA violation. Early self-reporting is a first step in cooperating with the SEC and DOJ and often leads to lower fines, as was the case with Imnospec.

FCPA compliance has also become a hot topic in the M&A field. Latin Node and similar cases indicate that reliance on unsubstantiated representations and warranties regarding FCPA compliance in the definitive agreement for an M&A transaction may not be enough. Risk-based FCPA due diligence can help an acquiror identify potential FCPA violations by a target company during the due diligence phase, before signing a definitive agreement. An assessment of a target company's FCPA compliance risk can be a useful first step. This generally includes evaluating the risk of corruption in each country where the target does business. Transparency International's corruption index map is a great resource for this.

The following due diligence actions may be appropriate, based on the results of the initial risk assessment:
• Include in the initial due diligence request list specific questions regarding the target's FCPA compliance program and any due diligence procedures that the target has implemented for third party agents;
• Conduct on-site interviews and audits regarding high-risk transactions;
• Use resources provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce's International Company Profile program; and
• Include FCPA compliance experts on legal and accounting due diligence teams.

We suggest documenting any due diligence efforts that an acquiror undertakes to confirm a target company's FCPA compliance.

Here are some examples of "red flags" that may be found during due diligence:

• Use of third party agents to arrange business with governmental entities;
• Employment of senior management with close ties to government officials; or
• Payments for which documentation is not available or the purpose for which appears to be vague.
If an acquiror discovers any red flags, here are some examples of follow-up that may be helpful:
• submit follow-up due diligence requests regarding the compliance issue;
• engage forensic accountants to audit all of target's transactions in a particular category, such as employee reimbursements;
• consult with in-country experts regarding relevant local customs or practices; or
• conduct on-site interviews of implicated employees or agents.
If an FCPA violation is uncovered, the acquiror will likely want to evaluate whether the proposed transaction still makes sense from an economic and reputational perspective. If so, it may be advisable for the acquiror to immediately begin discussions with the target regarding self-reporting and otherwise cooperating with the SEC and DOJ. 

Thanks to Adam Glant, a business associate in the firm's Seattle office, for contributing to this post.
 

Letters of Intent: Traps for the Unwary

A recent ruling made by the Delaware Court of Chancery serves as a reminder to exercise caution in drafting letters of intent.

In Global Asset Capital, LLC ("Global") v. Rubicon US Reit, Inc. ("Rubicon"), C.A. No. 5071-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2009), the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered Rubicon to stop engaging in activities that the court ruled constituted a breach of Rubicon's obligations under its letter of intent (LOI) with Global.

Background

A summary of the facts as alleged in the case:  Facing possible bankruptcy, Rubicon decided to enter into an LOI with Global that contemplated that Rubicon would file for bankruptcy in conjunction with signing a final agreement with Global.  Under that agreement, Global would act as a stalking horse bidder in a court-supervised auction of Rubicon's assets.

The LOI also prohibited Rubicon from disclosing the terms of the LOI to third parties and prohibited Rubicon from soliciting other offers during the term of the LOI.  In addition, the LOI included a provision that the parties would work toward negotiating a final agreement.

Soon after signing the LOI, Rubicon disclosed the terms of the LOI to its creditors to gain leverage in an effort to relieve its liquidity problems. Rubicon then failed to respond to Global's initial draft of a final agreement and instead proceeded to solicit alternative offers.

Not surprisingly, Global filed suit against Rubicon asking the Court to enjoin Rubicon from further disclosing the terms of the LOI and entertaining alternative offers. Global also asked the court to compel Rubicon to move forward with a finalizing an agreement and filing for bankruptcy.

Rubicon argued that since it no longer had an urgent liquidity crisis, the LOI had essentially expired. Alternatively, Rubicon argued that even if it was obligated under the LOI, the fiduciary duties of its directors to keep the company out of bankruptcy conflicted with the LOI, and therefore, its performance under the LOI was excused.

The Court granted Global's motion and ordered Rubicon to stop disclosing the terms of the LOI and soliciting other offers. In its analysis, the Court emphasized several key points.

First, sufficiently clear LOI's do create enforceable obligations.  If the parties don't intend to create enforceable obligations, then they should expressly say so in the LOI.

Second, an agreement to negotiate in an LOI represents a concrete obligation to do so and failure to meet this obligation may constitute a breach of the agreement.

Finally, the Court pointed out that Delaware courts don't recognize an inherent fiduciary-out where the obligations in a contract conflict with the fiduciary duties of the company's directors - if contracting parties want to have a fiduciary out, they must include express language allowing for it.

Practical Take-Aways

The Global case serves as an important reminder: 

  • Always indicate in an LOI which provisions are intended to be binding and which are not.
  • Do not include a covenant to work toward a final agreement unless you intend to do just that.
  • Include express language allowing for fiduciary or other outs if that is the intent is that one or more of the parties are to have such an out.

What Every Entrepreneur Needs to Know About Selling a Company to a Private Equity Buyer

If you're an entrepreneur running an emerging company with a strategy of exploring an M&A exit, then this post was created for you. 

There are basically two types of buyers: strategic buyers and financial buyers. Rather than constructing precise definitions of these two profiles, for the sake of this post, let's assume that (1) a strategic buyer is a large-cap, publicly-traded company with plenty of cash on its balance sheet and a growth strategy that includes a meaningful M&A program, and (2) a financial buyer is a private equity fund.

In his new book, "Never Make the First Offer (Except When You Should)", Donald Dell concisely points out one of the principal guidelines for negotiating a deal: Know Your Audience. While this tenet seems obvious, in my experience, sellers sometimes either aren't aware, or can under-estimate the importance, of the distinct profile and objectives of the financial buyer as compared to the strategic buyer

The purpose of this post is to try to shed some light on some of these basic distinctions for entrepreneurs thinking about an M&A exit.  While each deal has its own set of circumstances, and each party in any given deal may have unique objectives, there are some generalized distinctions between these two types of buyers. Two of the core distinctions are discussed in this post—namely, strategic and financial buyers' (1) objectives, and (2) approach to pricing. In turn, these comparative distinctions drive other aspects of deals with strategic and financial buyers that are not explicitly discussed in this post (e.g., financing contingencies).

OBJECTIVES

Unsurprisingly, most buyers—strategic and financial alike—engage in acquisitions to make money. That said, the key differentiator between strategic and financial buyers is that financial buyers are structured at their inception to put money to work for a defined period of time (typically exiting each investment within three to five years) with a certain expected return on their investment upon exit, and each fund making those investments has a limited life (e.g., 10 years). The strategic buyer, on the other hand, often has either no or a flexible targeted return, and often has no real time horizon for achieving that return; rather, the acquisition is expected to be . . . strategic. Compared to the financial buyer, the strategic buyer (1) can be relatively flexible and patient in procuring a return on its investment, (2) might engage in a riskier M&A strategy that assumes some smaller acquisitions might be worth pursuing even if some acquisitions ultimately fail, and (3) can execute an M&A transaction for strategic reasons that have little to do with producing absolute returns above benchmarks for competing investments (e.g., the buyer may decide to spend several million dollars precluding a competitor from entering a certain space, even if the target is not projected to directly add to the buyer's bottom line).

Knowing and proactively attending to the financial buyer's objectives upfront can make all the difference in building and maintaining momentum from an initial meeting through closing the deal and, as a result, maximizing value.  For example, a financial buyer will typically be razor-focused throughout the due diligence process on any developments that might have an impact on its financial modeling. Each dollar shortfall of, say, EBITDA, is not just a dollar to the financial buyer. The reason relates to pricing.  

PRICING

One way to appreciate the distinction between how financial and strategic buyers price acquisitions is to think about two classes of buyers with differing motivations for purchasing a house. The young family hoping to live in a house for many years to come and enjoy its intangible benefits, in some ways, is much like the strategic buyer. While the young family will reach its price limit based on perceived value and availability of funds, there may be no formula or identifiable metric that will be applied by this buyer to methodically determine value or its price threshold. On the other hand, the home developer, in some ways, resembles the financial buyer. The home developer will, in determining its top price, calculate the cost of purchasing the house, the cost of developing the house, the cost of financing the property in the interim period, the market risk of holding the house during that period, and the fair market value of the development team's time in building and re-selling the house—all compared to returns that could reasonably be expected from an alternative investment during that time period. The young family may run a similar analysis, but will have some freedom to make exceptions and out-spend the home developer if it makes sense on some intangible level. For example, some young families might pay a seemingly high premium to buy a house with "the perfect kitchen" (as an aggressive technology company might pay a sensible premium for some IP that is perceived to be of high value but is too early in its evolution to relate to an identifiable market); the home developer, however, would only pay a premium for the perfect kitchen if the developer could infer a positive (or at least not a negative) incremental return; absent that inference, the perfect kitchen is simply a drain on projected returns. 

Financial buyers typically price acquisitions based on cash flow, which is usually calculated based on some variation of an EBITDA (earnings before taking into account deductions for interest, tax, depreciation and amortization expenses) metric. The price, from the financial buyer's perspective, is often phrased as an "EBITDA multiple". 

For example, if the target's EBITDA (either for the last 12 months or as projected for the next 12 months) is $5 million and the purchase price that the financial buyer would need to pay to get the deal is $25 million, then the "EBITDA multiple" would be 5x. 

Pricing based on an EBITDA multiple is of critical importance to the financial buyer, since the banks providing debt financing for the transaction will reach their funding limit based on an EBITDA multiple as well. The multiple as of any given time will depend on a variety of factors, including broader market conditions. For example, a senior lender may be willing to provide an amount of debt equal to 2x EBITDA, and a mezzanine or subordinated lender may be willing to provide an amount of debt equal to 1x EBITDA. That leaves an additional 2x EBITDA, which would be financed by cash, in the form of an equity infusion, by the financial buyer. 

Essentially, the financially buyer has put 40% down on its investment, and has leveraged the remainder. In performing its financial due diligence, the financial buyer will run elaborate financial models designed to provide insight as to whether a later resale of the subject company is likely to command a price that achieves a certain baseline return on the financial buyer's equity investment (often in the 20%+ range). These ROI targets are designed to (1) attract and maintain the inflow of funds from the financial buyer's limited partner investors who, in turn, monitor their returns from private equity partnership interests as compared to alternative investment opportunities and (2) provide a sufficient "carry" to the financial buyer (i.e., the general partner of the fund) and its principals.

The strategic buyer doesn't have such rigid restraints, but, on the flip-side, the strategic buyer cannot necessarily be expected to be twice (or more, on the basis of leverage) as excited for a deal that might be projected to produce twice the EBITDA of a competing acquisition target. The deal has to make strategic sense—whatever that means in the context of the particular buyer and seller (typically technology and human resources)—with less regard to financial projections than that applied by the financial buyer.

PRACTICAL TAKE-AWAYS

Like Dell's advice to "Know Your Audience", the above overview is fairly basic and obvious on its face, but is hopefully a good reminder that not every M&A exit is the same, and a seller can have a meaningful opportunity to maximize value by customizing its approach to a deal depending on the profile and objectives of the likely buyer.

More specifically, consider the following:

·        Company Information: A seller might consider preparing customized offering materials (e.g., a teaser / executive summary, information statement, etc.)—one set for strategic buyers and one set for financial buyers. While the overall information may be largely identical, the prioritization and emphasis could vary between the two sets of documents.

·        Price Expectations: A seller should approach a sale process armed with up-to-date information as to (1) recent comparable sales from which its value assumptions are derived, with further comparisons of prices obtained from financial vs. strategic buyers, and (2) the current availability and terms of debt financing for the acquisition.

·        Readiness to Transact: If the seller has a need, for whatever reason, to quickly initiate a sale process and must prioritize its preparation for engaging with potential buyers, the management team should consider whether to focus on financial statements and systems, confirming adequate protection of its core intellectual property, gauging its employees' interest in continuing employment with certain potential buyers, etc. commensurate with the profile and likely priorities of the likely buyer.

·        Hiring Advisors: The seller should consider hiring a reputable investment banker with industry-specific expertise and experience engaging with strategic and financial buyers alike. The seller should also engage counsel and other advisors with particular expertise successfully completing deals with the type of buyer likely to engage with the selling company.

J.P. Morgan Releases 2009 M&A Holdback Escrow Report

JPMorgan Chase & Co. recently published its 2009 M&A Holdback Escrow Report. The study summarizes data points relating to holdback escrow accounts used in M&A transactions. The study defines "holdback escrow" as an escrow structure in which a portion of the deal consideration is placed into escrow as security for any post-closing purchase price adjustments or indemnification claims.  The sample size of the study is 443 transactions between January 2007 and June 2008 in which J.P. Morgan was engaged.

A few observations:

  • Escrow Deposit Amount: The study reflects that 7 – 15% of the purchase price was deposited in 51% of deals reviewed in the study, with 10% of the purchase price as the median amount deposited. (See page 5 of the study).
  • Escrow Lifespan: 50% of agreements reviewed in the study specified a termination date to disburse funds, and 50% provided that the escrow would terminate only upon written instruction of the parties to disburse funds. For deals with scheduled disbursement dates, the time periods for disbursements ranged from one month to 72 months. The most common scheduled disbursement dates were set at 12, 18 and 24 months from the closing date. (See page 6 of the study).
  • Claims—Generally: Claims were made in 40% of the deals reviewed in the study. Of that 40%, 25% of such claims related to a working capital or other contemplated purchase price adjustment and the remaining 75% related to indemnification claims. Of 178 indemnification claims made by buyers, 176 received a recovery of some amount. The average recovery was 60% of the original claim. (See page 9 of the study).
  • Types of Indemnification Claims: Of all indemnification claims made in the deals reviewed in the study, those claims were categorized as follows: (1) breach of representations and warranties (40%); (2) not specified or "other" (33%); (3) accounts receivable (11%); (4) tax (7%); (5) environmental (3%); and (6) litigation (2%). (See page 10 of the study). 

Thanks to Michael Balliet for sending us the study.